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When the Chief of Naval Operations 
kindly invited me to initiate our dis-
cussions on this important subject, I had 
hoped that the recent session of the 
conference at New York would have got 
a little further. That progress was made, 
I am in no doubt. I am also in no doubt 
that it is very important that at their 
August 1976 session in New York 
enough progress is made to enable 
governments to agree to the broad terms 
of a new convention which could be 
finalized in 1977. 
But because of this rate of progress, 
it does mean that we can discuss the 
crucial issues the conference has before 
it in an unrestricted way and not feel 
bound by any positions our own govern-
ments might otherwise by now have 
adopted. Indeed, I must stress from the 
outset that my views are those of a 
professional naval officer, not of a 
maritime lawyer nor of an official nego-
tiating for his national interests in the 
matter. But it is inevitable that I will 
have frequently to refer to the argu-
ments that are still taking place in the 
conference for it is these that will 
colour the backcloth against which any 
future maritime operation will take 
place. 
Such operations in such a context are 
of, course, a peaceful exercise of mari-
time power. I do not address the ques-
tion of belligerence. 
My theme in this discussion of how a 
new convention might affect future 
maritime operations is that the corner-
stone of any future convention must be 
the maintenance of the often challenged 
but long established freedoms of the 
Seas. I hope to show you that both 
maritime and coastal states stand to gain 
by the maintenance of this concept. 
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Freedom of the seas, of course, implies 
not only a freedom of action but a 
responsibility to respect the rights of 
others. I acknowledge from the start, 
and I will go over the ground in more 
detail later on, that we are living in a 
changing world and that there is a very 
reasonable case to be put which calls for 
more careful definition of the rights of 
states on, in, and under the oceans of 
the world. States have every right to 
look to their security and economic 
interests: and the better understanding 
that is reached on these issues, the less 
chance there is of friction and tension. 
A new convention will depend entirely 
on a sound balance of all interests being 
struck. The United Kingdom has both 
maritime and coastal state interests. We 
firmly believe in the maintenance of the 
balance of strategic deterrence and 
depend extensively for our livelihood on 
unfettered contacts with our trading 
partners-we have the third largest mer-
cantile marine in the world (after 
Liberia and Japan). At the same time, 
our geographical position as an island 
state, separated from our European 
neighbours by the busiest straits of the 
world, on a continental shelf rich in 
hydrocarbons and fish, gives us signifi-
cant coastal state interests. A balanced 
convention is therefore as vital to my 
country as to any. 
We have only reached this view after 
many years as a maritime nation and in 
common with most of us here could not 
claim to have been consistent in our 
views over the last 2,000 years. Let me 
say something since nothing is new 
under the sun, least of all the ocean, 
about those 2,000 years and the sum of 
human experience they convey to us. 
In the earliest days the sea was 
believed not only to hold inexhaustible 
stocks of fish, which were free for 
anyone to take, but to extend over such 
vast distances that the waters themselves 
could not similarly be taken. What 
could not be taken was free for com-
mon use by all men. To the Romans 
who enshrined this principle in the 
Justinian Code, such a view was 
probably more a luxury that the un-
disputed masters of the Mediterranean 
could well afford, since it was unlikely 
that anyone would challenge it, rather 
than an act of liberal statesmanship. 
Nevertheless, after the collapse of the 
Roman Empire there was no major 
change to this principle until the cru-
sades brought a Europe emerging from 
the Dark Ages into contact with the 
Mediterranean. This stimulus to com-
merce allowed Mediterranean practice, 
Roman in origin, to spread to the 
Atlantic seaboard, and the rolls of 
Oleron gained immediate success and 
wide recognition among the nations of 
North West Europe. But although these 
codes talked of freedom, this freedom 
began to become discretionary. As 
Mediterranean trade revived in the 13th 
and 14th centuries, the conflicting 
claims of the trading nations on the 
waters around their coasts became the 
dominant issues. 
The Venetians began to charge a fee 
for entering the Adriatic, and Venice's 
chief rival, Genoa, claimed similar juris-
diction over the Ligurian Sea. In north-
west Europe, countries made similar 
claims: The Danes, Swedes, and Poles 
claimed various parts of the Baltic and 
the English, with what some of you may 
feel was characteristic expansiveness, 
the channel, the North Sea, and the 
whole of the Western Atlantic. Slowly 
the sea from being free from any juris-
diction became, like the land, subject to 
the authority of those who had the 
power to enforce that authority. But 
the two great naval powers of the day 
were Spain and Portugal and, using the 
Pope as a maritime arbitrator which had 
the wholly desirable effect of giving 
their claims the authority of God, they 
began to apportion the oceans of the 
world between them so that both coun-
tries' interests in their newly discovered 
possessions in the Americas, East and 
West Indies, Africa, and India were 
protected. Their dominance culminated 
in the Treaty of Tordesillas which, in 
effect, divided the globe in half; a 
feature which even the Pope had sought 
to avoid. 
With the growth of English naval 
power in the middle of the 16th 
century, her ships began to challenge 
the monopoly of Spanish trade with the 
Indies. The first Queen Elizabeth sought 
to justify the activities of men like Sir 
Francis Drake by an appeal to the 
principle of the freedom of the seas-the 
first time this concept had been ex-
pressed for four or more centuries. Her 
Majesty refused to concede that Spain 
"had any right to debar British subjects 
from trade or from freely sailing that 
vast ocean, seeing that the use of the sea 
and air is common to all: neither can 
any title to the ocean belong to any 
people." 
While England was having difficulties 
with Spain, Holland, which was also 
increasing in power, was having the 
same difficulties with Portugal. The 
Portuguese cited the Papal Bull of 1493 
in support of their trade monopoly; to 
counter their arguments Grotius wrote 
his famous treatise on the law of the 
sea. He stated quite categorically that 
"Since the sea is just as unsusceptible of 
physical appropriation as the air, it 
cannot be attached to the possession of 
any nation." 
By this time, however, the British 
had forgotten their late Queen's stand 
and her successor, King James I, com-
missioned John Selden to write a refuta-
tion of Grotius supporting the concept 
of a closed sea; a principle which was 
duly followed so long as the British felt 
that their interests were best served by 
protecting their trade against foreign 
competition. However, during the 18th 
century there was a slow and gradual 
change in British policy. The old order 
whereby strong maritime powers waged 
war to protect their trade was changed 
by the Industrial Revolution in England. 
There was for a time thereafter no 
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foreign competition, and so British in-
terests were now best served by com-
pletely free and unrestricted trade. 
Thus, by the early 19th century Britain 
was once again an unequivocal sup-
porter of the freedom of the seas. 
It seems clear that the policy of the 
superior maritime power, and not for 
the first time, carried the day. When one 
power has been predominant, freedom 
of the seas has been its policy. It would 
be an oversimplification to say that 
when dominance of the sea was in 
doubt nations pursued a policy of 
closed seas which went unchallenged 
until one power again became predomi-
nant, but it is nevertheless not far from 
the truth. 
Later on I will attempt to show how 
the maintenance of the freedom of the 
seas has developed from being princi-
pally in the interests of major maritime 
powers to the situation today when it 
safeguards the interests of the interna-
tional community. 
As trade increased, piracy became a 
growing nuisance on an international 
scale. Initially countries were content to 
rid the seas of pirates harassing their 
own trade while being quite content to 
let them do their worst among their 
rivals. Nevertheless, the consciences of 
some enlightened men and the timing of 
history ensured that piracy and the slave 
trade were suppressed in an era when 
the principle of the freedom of seas was 
being upheld under the umbrella of Pax 
Britannica. It could not have been ef-
fected in the absence of the freedom of 
the seas, and the dividend this then gave 
is enjoyed by all nations. 
Another example of benefit from the 
freedom of the seas is to be found in the 
contribution to the surveying and 
charting which has been done for over 
200 years by the hydrographic fleets of 
our various countries. Their freedom of 
navigation and their cooperation results 
in world chart series for all the mariners 
of every nation. There is no ship which 
does not benefit from the ability to sail 
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and work on the seas of the world with 
hydrographic data which has resulted 
from this very freedom of access. Long 
may it continue. 
That having been said, we all know 
that the law of the sea is not merely an 
affirmation of unfettered freedom. The 
freedom of the high seas became a 
regulated freedom through agreements 
by flag states that their ships should 
follow certain rules about safety, avoid-
ance of collisions, interference with 
submarine cables, and similar matters of 
general concern. It is important to 
recognize, however, that ships were to 
be regulated only by their own flag 
states. 
In more modern times came the 
recognition that the coastal state had an 
interest, and indeed a claim, on the belt 
of water immediately surrounding its 
own coastline. This claim was ultimately 
recognized in the concept of the terri-
torial sea. The development which 
balanced this concession to absolute 
freedom at sea was the establishment of 
the right of innocent passage through 
the territorial sea. Coastal states 
accepted the erosion of full sovereignty 
implicit in the acknowledgement that a 
foreign ship could not be prevented 
arbitrarily from passing through the 
territorial sea so long as she was doing 
no harm. 
This harmonious compromise was 
further developed by the 1958 Geneva 
Conventions on the law of the sea. What 
started as an attempt to codify all past 
practice, in fact, went further and re-
sulted in recognition of the increasing 
attention being given to the exploitation 
of the resources of the sea and the 
seabed, and whilst high seas freedoms 
were to a large extent preserved, these 
conventions for the first time addressed 
the rights to exploit the resources of 
continental shelves and the conservation 
of the living resources of the high seas. 
The 1958 Geneva Conventions have, 
I believe, served the international com-
munity well. The listing of the freedoms 
of the high seas was useful, as were the 
provisions concerning nationality for all 
ships, piracy, and slave trading. So also 
were the definition of innocence of 
passage in the territorial seas as being 
not prejudicial to the peace, good order, 
and security of the coastal state; the 
definition of the rights of hot pursuit; 
and the safeguarding of the right of 
passage through straits. There were also 
many other valuable provisions relating 
to navigation and resource exploitation. 
But there were major omissions too, the 
most far reaching being the failure of 
the 1958 conference to agree on a 
maximum breadth for the territorial sea 
and the failure to set objective limits to 
coastal state rights in respect of fisheries 
and the continental shelf. The large 
increase since 1958 in the number of 
merchant ships sailing under flags of 
convenience has also called into ques-
tion whether dependence on flag state 
regulation is sufficient to safeguard 
coastal state interest. 
The main pressure for a new law of 
the sea convention has, however, been 
generated by the increase of man's 
knowledge associated with a desire to 
exploit the resources of the sea and the 
seabed. "The common heritage of man 
should be used for the benefit of man-
kind as a whole" is a popular cry. If we 
are to use the seas and the resources in 
and under the sea for the benefit of the 
international community in an orderly 
fashion, we must aim to reexamine and 
strengthen existing law to fit today's 
circumstances and fill in the gaps in the 
1958 conventions that I have already 
mentioned. 
There are, of course, a number of 
ways of doing this, and it is precisely 
because of this fact that negotiations in 
the conference directed toward reaching 
a consensus have been prolonged and 
difficult. A position somewhere be-
tween the somewhat imprecise but 
possibly, maritime oriented regime that 
came from the 1958 conventions and 
those states who have been calling for 
extensive coastal state sovereignty and 
jurisdiction must be found. 
We must not be discouraged by the 
length of negotiations on this complex 
subject. Each member state of the 
United Nations surely has to attend to 
its own immediate needs before acting 
as a member of the international com-
munity to safeguard the broader world 
interest. 
With good reason coastal states are 
concerned with sovereign rights, and the 
obvious proof of the growing concern 
for this is to be found in the large 
increase in the number of states now 
claiming a wider territorial sea. The 
numbers have increased markedly since 
1958. Some states believe that an exten-
sion of sovereignty over the sea is an 
essential safeguard to their security. 
There is much public discussion of 
security, both in the defense or military 
sense and also in the civil or police 
sense. Many newly emergent and 
emerging states think of increased 
sovereignty as an essential precursor of 
economic well-being. Many states also, 
and my own is no exception, look to 
the wealth of the natural resources of 
the continental shelf to contribute sub-
stantially to economic well-being and 
are showing a real concern about con-
servation of fish stocks and an under-
standable feeling that they should have 
prime responsibility for assuring the 
future of a resource they claim for their 
own country. However we must remem-
ber the other side of the coin. 
This is that to extend the frontiers of 
sovereignty is at the same time to 
increase the burden of national security 
and certainly not to make it easier. If 
we are to develop new laws, we must 
ensure that either the coastal state or 
the international community has the 
ability to enforce them. Laws that 
cannot be upheld fall into disrepute and 
are certain sources of international fric-
tion. While I well understand the 
importance of the work being done in 
the present conference on the 
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settlement of disputes, I am sure we 
would rather that its aim should be a 
consensus likely to minimize the occur-
rence of disputes. Moreover, it is 
axiomatic that the greater the area of 
the continental shelf or greater the 
volume of water that the coastal state 
can lay claim to, the less the resources 
freely available to others. 
One of us here represents a land-
locked state, and there are others 
amongst us whose countries say that 
they are geographically disadvantaged. 
Any view that the seas are free requires 
that the rights of every member of the 
international community be considered 
in drawing up the balance between the 
interests of the coastal state and the 
community as a whole. There is no 
shortage of public discussion on this 
either. 
Coastal states have a third interest 
which is gaining in importance as the 
worldwide lobby for the protection of 
the environment grows. None of us here 
would quarrel with the need to take 
every reasonable precaution to minimize 
the risk caused by collisions and ground-
ings or by poor construction of ships. 
Pollution control, too, is listed high in 
the requirements of all these days. It is 
an important matter which the con-
vention must address. 
I mentioned earlier that flag states 
had come to accept the need for certain 
rules to guide the conduct of shipping. 
An amalgam of these rules on safety, 
the avoidance of collision and pollution 
control add up in many minds not 
merely to the maintenance of good 
order but to the need for traffic regula-
tions as the means of assuring it. Sea-
lanes and traffic separation schemes do, 
of course, have a valuable part to play. 
The United Kingdom and France believe 
that they have already been instru-
mental in improving traffic conditions 
in the Dover Strait, and they look 
forward to the observance of these 
schemes becoming mandatory. I would 
welcome also the establishment of 
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similar schemes in other busy shipping 
areas around the world. Latterly the 
International Maritime Consultative 
Organization (IMCO) has taken the lead 
in initiating international conventions in 
this broad field of good order at sea. 
However, IMCO neither lays down nor 
enforces law. Governments use the 
IMCO machinery to conclude agree-
ments, and it is their responsibility to 
give these agreements the force of law. 
Should we not agree to urge our govern-
ments to place their trust in IMCO and 
make proposals to it? Furthermore, 
should we not also agree that we should 
urge our governments to ratify conven-
tions agreed through IMCO and to 
enforce rigorously the ensuring legisla-
tion? 
The international community cur-
rently accepts that outside the terri-
torial sea it remains the flag state's 
responsibility to enforce regulations on 
their own shipowners and masters. To 
overcome the laxity of some flag states 
and in particular to regulate those ships 
that sail under a flag of convenience, it 
may be necessary to introduce a dif-
ferent enforcement regime. Considera-
tion should be given to what seems a 
very sensible idea that a form of port 
state jurisdiction may well provide a 
better balance between the interests of 
the coastal state and those of the 
international community, the theory 
here being that a coastal state whose 
regulations have been flouted and who 
does not have confidence that the flag 
state will take appropriate action will 
appeal to the state into whose port the 
offending ship next calls to prosecute 
that ship. 
Let me now summarize the coastal 
state's interests as I have outlined them 
to you. They amount, I suggest, to "a 
requirement to extend their sovereignty 
and jurisdiction into the sea area and on 
to the continental shelf, adjacent to 
their shores so as to ensure their state's 
security, militarily, economically and 
ecologically. " 
I have previously laid emphasis on 
the meeting of these justifiable aims 
while preserving the natural maritime 
rights of the international community as 
a whole. Furthermore, in examining the 
history of those rights, we saw how we 
arrived at the basic doctrine of high seas 
freedoms on the back of maritime 
power. In the remainder of my talk I 
would like to show that these freedoms 
developed in the last 150 years now 
safeguard the rights of the international 
community. 
The high seas freedoms stipulated in 
the 1958 convention were the freedom 
of navigation and overflight, the 
freedom to fish, the freedom to lay 
submarine cables and pipelines, and 
other generally recognized and cus-
tomary international freedoms. 
I would like to dwell for a while on 
what to us, as mariners, must be the 
most important aspect, "freedom of 
navigation and overflight." 
We are not in this convention ad-
dressing the historic rights of warships 
in time of war. Nevertheless, in spite of 
the fact that I have barely mentioned 
any military matters so far, I still see a 
very clear role for the military in the 
wake of a new convention. We are all 
here because our countries deem it 
necessary to maintain navies for reasons 
of national security. Warships have 
traditionally been involved with main-
taining the freedom of navigation of 
merchant ships, and we would claim 
that the deployment of our navy in 
support of trade has been a stabilizing 
factor in increasing world prosperity. 
In the past the number of ships 
engaged in trade that plied the seas was 
miniscule compared with the number 
today. Under the umbrella of high seas 
freedom and as the economies of the 
countries of the world partly under 
imperial influences expanded during the 
19th century, trade began to flow in all 
directions. This expansion has accel-
erated as the colonial empires have 
waned and the colonies and pro-
tectorates have become independent 
countries. With the growth of interna-
tional companies and the complex 
economic relations that exist today, the 
very foundation of our society depends 
for its future on economic efficiency. 
To carry cargo by sea is and will remain 
in the foreseeable future the most cost 
effective manner of trading. We see 
examples everyday of the world's de-
pendence on energy supplies, and the 
battle against poverty and starvation can 
only begin to be tackled with any hope 
of success if trade across the sea is 
allowed to proceed about its lawful 
occasions, unhampered and unmolested. 
Economic stability is intrinsically 
bound up with the balance of power 
and in this imperfect world in which we 
live the balance of strategic deterrence is 
of the utmost importance. We surely 
must accept the fact that navies have a 
part to play in maintaining that balance 
of power and that they must operate 
and train in the areas in which they 
need to exert their power. These areas 
coincide with the world sea routes 
which, in many cases, pass through what 
we expect to become economic zones. 
Efforts in the past to declare zones of 
peace have much to commend them, 
but they will never be zones of peace 
for all the fine words that are spoken 
unless we can be confident that no one 
will cheat. Let us not delude ourselves, 
we cannot be certain of that today. No 
doubt we all look forward to the day 
when world tensions are eased and that 
the opportunity occurs for the major 
alliances to scale down the effort de-
ployed to maintain this strategic bal-
ance, but we must deal with things as 
they are and not as we would wish them 
to be. Meanwhile we should, I think, 
take advantage of the phenomenon that 
we are in the presence today of an 
expanding maritime power, which is far 
from achieving that position of mari-
time dominance that I have historically 
associated with allegiance to the 
freedom of the seas and which seems to 
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be content, for reasons which are not 
yet clear, to support a doctrine of 
maritime freedom. 
I have now outlined to you why I see 
a requirement for the coast states' needs 
to be put in perspective with the re-
quirements to safeguard the rights of 
the international community. 
Let us then assume that we achieve 
an acceptable balance of interest in an 
internationally agreed convention. The 
need will then arise for coastal states to 
evolve internationally acceptable 
methods of enforcing the laws which 
they will be entitled and indeed have a 
duty to enact. 
Varying historical and constitutional 
factors will influence the way different 
countries tackle the task. It would be 
wrong to assume that there is a single 
correct way and if others do not do 
things in the way we do, either they or 
we are in error. I would like to explain 
to you how we in the United Kingdom 
see ourselves undertaking this. We could 
have established some kind of force on 
the lines of the U.S. Coast Guard and 
this may be an attractive model for 
many countries to follow. We have, 
however, decided to meet our expected 
increased responsibilities by the devel-
opment and improvement of the exist-
ing pattern involving continuing co-
operation between the civil authorities 
concerned and our Armed Forces rather 
than by some radical change. The Royal 
Navy has for many years provided ships 
for fishery protection duties, and 
though the extent of this task will 
increase, it will hopefully be carried out 
in an atmosphere of international 
accord. 
As regards fixed offshore installa-
tions, these are of course subject to the 
normal external threat posed by another 
power and in this respect we see the 
services defending them within the 
framework of their normal function to 
defend the realm. But today we face an 
increasing threat from terrorists. Many 
people advance the theory that an oil 
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platform, like an aircraft, is an attractive 
target for hijackers wishing to gain 
publicity. Around our shores, in the 
stormy waters of the North Sea and off 
the Coast of the Shetlands, to hijack an 
oil rig to make a political point such as 
demanding the release of political 
prisoners would be very difficult and 
require considerable skill and resources. 
There are many targets associated with 
the oil and gas industries ashore which it 
would be much more easy to tackle. 
Nevertheless, there is a threat, and in 
our view that is best met by mounting 
deterrent patrols by ships and aircraft. 
Sophisticated ships are not needed for 
this. The important thing is to deploy 
ships with good seakeeping qualities and 
good communications. If the ships and 
aircraft can be seen and heard they 
deter, and if any incident occurs they 
have the ability to get to the scene 
quickly and observe and report. This is 
also a priceless asset in the event of an 
accident. A new convention will, we 
assume, confirm the existing entitle-
ment of the coastal state to establish 
safety zones around installations on its 
continental shelf and even enhance their 
status. In the light of this we envisage a 
requirement to operate a force of about 
eight ships backed up by fixed wing 
surveillance aircraft and shorebased heli-
copters to undertake concurrently 
fishery protection and deterrent patrols 
in the area of offshore installations. We 
have choseA a 200-foot lightly armed 
ship of about 1,300 tons to fulfill these 
tasks. In the poor weather conditions 
around our coasts we have decided that 
an all-weather capability is more im-
portant than high speed, and thus the 
fast patrol boat, an attractive option for 
many countries, is not a realistic one for 
the United Kingdom. 
We also envisage these ships being 
useful in reporting incidences of pollu-
tion and for assistance in maintaining 
good order in traffic separation 
schemes. Here our aim is to advise 
shipping on the state of traffic so that it 
can more easily follow the traffic sepa-
ration scheme. We have not found it 
either practical or desirable to attempt 
to positively control the traffic, be-
lieving that no sea captain would take 
kindly to being controlled from shore 
and that an attempt to do so would be 
likely to lead to more radio assisted 
collisions than it avoided. 
In all these tasks we see our forces 
being used to safeguard our coastal 
states' rights and at the same time to 
ensure that the rights of the interna-
tional community will be served as 
well-they will be there to monitor and 
report. The legal action that ensues 
from any incident they observe will be 
taken up by the civil authorities. 
Maybe in due course an international 
force should be set up to carry out these 
tasks. Perhaps regional arrangements can 
be expanded. We already have in the 
Northeastern Atlantic a fisheries con-
vention whereby some 14 countries 
(both East and West) agree to the 
monitoring of each other's fleets by 
fishery protection ships flying an inter-
national fishery protection flag. 
But before that kind of situation can 
become commonplace we must achieve 
an agreed and acceptable convention. 
Inevitably there will have to be compro-
mises. Some may not be to the liking of 
the coastal states who may feel that 
their sovereignty, their ability to exploit 
their resources, is weakened. Some may 
not wholly suit the maritime powers 
who will find rights and privileges long 
taken for granted will become condi-
tional. And in the balance it will be the 
coastal states who will have the major 
increase in the responsibility for safe-
guarding all our rights in their waters. 
Those of us who know how very seri-
ously the progress of mankind can be 
hampered by failure to resolve issues 
such as those the convention has to 
address can only wish the negotiators 
well. I do not think I would be guilty of 
heresy if I said that it would be nice to 
think that the convention would put all 
us naval men out of a job, that there 
would be no need for armed forces at 
sea. But, as things stand today, there 
can be little prospect of this, and only 
by maximizing the flexibility of 
maritime forces can the burden they 
impose on national economies be 
reduced. 
Against this background of a future 
where the rights and responsibilities of 
maritime and coastal states will need 
some degree of enforcement and a 
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future where, power politics may make 
the movement of naval forces a sad but 
necessary condition of preserving 
peace and good order, may I suggest 
that we could usefully discuss the 
following points amongst ourselves: 
the rights and duties of warships 
under a new convention; the en-
forcement of the laws at sea; and the 
need to continue to operate and train 
in key areas to maintain the balance 
of deterrence. 
----'P----
